Reviewing the prior literature on executive decision-making, Eisenhardt found several patterns, although none of these patterns were specific to high-velocity environments. The literature suggested that in the interest of expediency, firms that make faster decisions obtain input from fewer sources, consider fewer alternatives, make limited analysis, restrict user participation in decision-making, centralize decision-making authority, and has limited internal conflicts. However, Eisenhardt contended that these views may not necessarily explain how decision makers make decisions in high-velocity environments, where decisions must be made quickly and with incomplete information, while maintaining high decision quality. To examine this phenomenon, Eisenhardt conducted an inductive study of eight firms in the personal computing industry. The personal computing industry was undergoing dramatic changes in technology with the introduction of the UNIX operating system, RISC architecture, and 64KB random access memory in the 1980’s, increased competition with the entry of IBM into the personal computing business, and growing customer demand with double-digit demand growth, and therefore fit the profile of the high-velocity environment. This was a multiple case design with replication logic, where each case was expected to confirm or disconfirm inferences from other cases. Case sites were selected based on their access and proximity to the researcher; however, all of these firms operated in the high-velocity personal computing industry in California’s Silicon Valley area. The collocation of firms in the same industry and the same area ruled out any “noise” or variance in dependent variables (decision speed or performance) attributable to industry or geographic differences. The study employed an embedded design with multiple levels of analysis: decision (comparing multiple strategic decisions within each firm), executive teams (comparing different teams responsible for strategic decisions), and the firm (overall firm performance). Data was collected from five sources:  Initial interviews with Chief Executive Officers: CEOs were asked questions about their firm’s competitive strategy, distinctive competencies, major competitors, performance, and recent/ongoing major strategic decisions. Based on these interviews, several strategic decisions were selected in each firm for further investigation. Four criteria were used to select decisions: (1) the decisions involved the firm’s strategic positioning, (2) the decisions had high stakes, (3) the decisions involved multiple functions, and (4) the decisions were representative of strategic decision-making process in that firm.  Interviews with divisional heads: Each divisional head was asked sixteen open-ended questions, ranging from their firm’s competitive strategy, functional strategy, top management team members, frequency and nature of interaction with team, typical decision making processes, how each of the previously identified decision was made, and how long it took them to make those decisions. Interviews lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours, and sometimes extended to 4 hours. To focus on facts and actual events rather than respondents’ perceptions or interpretations, a “courtroom” style questioning was employed, such as when did this happen, what did you do, etc. Interviews were conducted by two people, and the data was validated by cross-checking facts and impressions made by the interviewer and note-taker. All interview data was recorded, however notes were also taken during each interview, which ended with the interviewer’s overall impressions. Using a “24-hour rule”, detailed field notes were completed within 24 hours of the interview, so that some data or impressions were not lost to recall. C a s e R e s e a r c h | 99  Questionnaires: Executive team members at each firm were completed a survey questionnaire that captured quantitative data on the extent of conflict and power distribution in their firm.  Secondary data: Industry reports and internal documents such as demographics of the executive teams (responsible for strategic decisions), financial performance of firms, and so forth, were examined.  Personal observation: Lastly, the researcher attended a 1-day strategy session and a weekly executive meeting at two firms in her sample. Data analysis involved a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques. Quantitative data on conflict and power were analyzed for patterns across firms/decisions. Qualitative interview data was combined into decision climate profiles, using profile traits (e.g., impatience) mentioned by more than one executive. For within-case analysis, decision stories were created for each strategic decision by combining executive accounts of the key decision events into a timeline. For cross-case analysis, pairs of firms were compared for similarities and differences, categorized along variables of interest such as decision speed and firm performance. Based on these analyses, tentative constructs and propositions were derived inductively from each decision story within firm categories. Each decision case was revisited to confirm the proposed relationships. The inferred propositions were compared with findings from the existing literature to reconcile examine differences with the extant literature and to generate new insights from the case findings. Finally, the validated propositions were synthesized into an inductive theory of strategic decision-making by firms in high-velocity environments. Inferences derived from this multiple case research contradicted several decisionmaking patterns expected from the existing literature. First, fast decision makers in highvelocity environments used more information, and not less information as suggested by the previous literature. However, these decision makers used more real-time information (an insight not available from prior research), which helped them identify and respond to problems, opportunities, and changing circumstances faster. Second, fast decision makers examined more (not fewer) alternatives. However, they considered these multiple alternatives in a simultaneous manner, while slower decision makers examined fewer alternatives in a sequential manner. Third, fast decision makers did not centralize decision making or restrict inputs from others, as the literature suggested. Rather, these firms used a two-tiered decision process in which experienced counselors were asked for inputs in the first stage, following by a rapid comparison and decision selection in the second stage. Fourth, fast decision makers did not have less conflict, as expected from the literature, but employed better conflict resolution techniques to reduce conflict and improve decision-making speed. Finally, fast decision makers exhibited superior firm performance by virtue of their built-in cognitive, emotional, and political processes that led to rapid closure of major decisions